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Abstract 
In a recent paper, Fernández (in press) argues that memory distortion can have beneficial 
outcomes. Although we agree with this, we find his reasoning and examples flawed to such 
degree that they will lead to misunderstandings rather than clarification in the field of memory 
(distortion). In his paper, Fernández uses the terms belief and memory incorrectly, creating a 
conceptual blur. Also, Fernández tries to make the case that under certain circumstances, false 
memories of abuse are beneficial. We argue against this idea as the reasoning behind this claim 
is based on controversial assumptions such as repression. Although it is true that memory 
distortions can be beneficial, the examples sketched by Fernández are not in line with recent 
documentation in this area.  
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What if You Went to the Police and Accused Your Uncle of Abuse?  
Misunderstandings Concerning the Benefits of Memory Distortion: 
A Commentary on Fernández (in press) 
In a recent paper, Fernández (in press) claims that under certain circumstances, distorted 
memories might be beneficial. Although we generally agree with the view that memory 
distortions can have positive consequences, we argue that the reasoning and examples used in 
Fernández’s paper are not in line with recent documentation concerning the functions of memory 
and its illusions. In our view, the incorrect reasoning in his paper might contribute to 
misunderstandings in the field of memory (distortion), misunderstandings that might affect 
theory and practice altogether.  
In this commentary, we articulate several points of contention concerning Fernández’s (in 
press) speculations about the positive aspects of memory distortion. Specifically, we will first 
elaborate on the ambiguous and loose use of concepts (i.e., belief and memory) in his paper. 
Second, we will explain that his fictional example of fabricated memories of abuse being 
sometimes beneficial rests on flawed assumptions. Third and finally, we argue that Fernández’s 
review of the benefits of memory distortion not only overlooked much of the literature in this 
area but also does not align well with recent evidence in this field.  
Belief versus Recollection
1
 
 In the paper, Fernández (in press) frequently resorts to the concept of belief to explain the 
positive effects of memory distortion. We applaud the use of this concept in the context of 
memory. Whereas previous memory research has often focused on instances in which belief and 
recollection are confounded (Smeets, Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & Jelicic, 2005), an 
increasingly large corpus of empirical research reveals that belief and recollection are two 
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distinct concepts (Otgaar, Scoboria, & Mazzoni, 2014). Recollection refers to a mental re-
experience accompanied by perceptual and emotional features that are perceived as indicative of 
the original experience (Brewer, 1996; James, 1890/1950; Rubin, 2006; Tulving, 1989). Belief, 
on the other hand, is a non-memorial judgment that is predominantly affected by social 
influences (Clark, Nash, Fincham, & Mazzoni, 2012; Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010; 
Otgaar, Smeets, & Scoboria, 2013). Memory researchers often adopt the term belief in 
occurrence to refer to the truth value attributed to whether an event happened or not, regardless 
of whether the event is recollected (Mazzoni et al., 2010; Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Relyea, 
2004).  
The distinction between belief in occurrence and recollection for an event is crucial. The 
majority of memory research focuses on believed memories; that is, instances in which research 
participants have both a recollection of and a belief in the previous occurrence of an event. 
However, on other occasions, researchers report that they tapped into participants’ recollections 
when in fact they measured their beliefs (see for an extensive discussion: Mazzoni & Kirsch, 
2002; Scoboria et al., 2004). It is therefore relevant that memory scholars are aware of the 
precise intricacies underlying belief in occurrence and recollection and recognize the differences 
and commonalities between them.  
In the paper by Fernández (in press), the concepts of belief and recollection are 
frequently used in an ambiguous manner thereby potentially confusing the memory field even 
further. Specifically, in our opinion, this author makes the following three mistakes. First, it 
appears that Fernández is assuming that in order to form a belief, one must first have a 
recollection. For example, Fernández argues (p. 2) that “[h]aving a memory may allow the 
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subject to form a belief about the past which has a certain instrumental value for her”. 
Furthermore, he argues (p. 3) that “[o]n the basis of my memory, I form the belief…”.  
However, research paints a different picture of the chronology of beliefs and 
recollections. According to the Nested Model proposed by Scoboria and colleagues (2004), in 
most instances, memory is nested within belief. The model stipulates that memory implies belief, 
thereby indicating that when a person recollects an event, he/she will have to – at least initially - 
believe in the occurrence of the event. So, it is not the case that beliefs are being formed after 
someone remembers an event, as the memory is already embedded in belief in the occurrence of 
the event. It is remarkable that the philosopher Fernández overlooked the point because the idea 
that beliefs are fundamental to – and indeed must precede – comprehension is essential in the 
work of Baruch de Spinoza (e.g., Gilbert, 1991), a primary author in the philosophical canon. 
Second, besides espousing an ambiguous chronological order of belief and recollection, 
Fernández (in press) is not very sensitive – perhaps unintentionally – to various forms of beliefs: 
Belief in occurrence of an event and belief in accuracy of event (Scoboria, Talarico, & Pascal, 
2015). The distinction between belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy is the difference 
between wondering whether an event occurred and whether an event is remembered in the way it 
occurred (Scoboria et al., 2015). To see how these types of belief are blurred in the paper, 
consider the following examples. Fernández (p. 3) writes phrases such as “…believing in the 
content of that memory” or “…beliefs about her past”. The first obviously refers to belief in 
accuracy, while the latter is more in line with how belief in occurrence is viewed. In his paper, 
Fernández frequently employs the overall term “beliefs”, without explaining what type of belief 
he is referring to. Although Fernández was probably unaware of the difference between these 
types of beliefs, differentiating between them is important. Recent research has shown that these 
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types of belief are distinct and can independently contribute to autobiographical remembering 
(Scoboria et al., 2015).  
Third, Fernández (in press) suggests that some forms of beliefs are relatively stable and 
are difficult to undermine. For example, he writes that (p. 2) “ justified beliefs confer a certain 
stability upon them.” Again, it is unclear what type of belief the author specifically has in mind. 
Moreover, recent experimentation shows that belief in the occurrence of events can quite easily 
be undermined and can even lead to a phenomenon called nonbelieved memories (Otgaar et al., 
2014). Nonbelieved memories refer to memories of events of which the belief that the event 
occurred is relinquished. Studies concentrating on nonbelieved memories demonstrated that 
when memories are challenged by confronting participants with external environmental output 
such as social feedback, about 20% of participants stop believing in the occurrence of the event 
while maintaining to have vivid recollections of the event (e.g., Clark et al., 2012; Mazzoni, 
Clark, & Nash, 2014; Mazzoni et al., 2010; Otgaar et al., 2013). This is obviously an exception 
to the Nested Model (Scoboria et al., 2004), although in these instances, people started with 
memories that were embedded in the belief that the memories referred to events that occurred to 
them.  
For example, in one of our studies, we used a false memory implantation procedure to 
evoke nonbelieved memories (Otgaar et al., 2013). Specifically, children and adults were falsely 
told that they were on a hot air balloon ride in their childhood. After two interviews with a 1-
week interval, participants created false memories of the event. However, after the last interview, 
participants were debriefed by telling them that the hot air balloon ride was not part of their 
autobiography. Following this, we measured their memory and belief for the false event. We 
found that a nontrivial minority (adults: 13%; children: 15%) of participants reported that they 
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did not believe in the occurrence of the false event, but still remembered details of the hot air 
balloon ride. Studies on nonbelieved memories are rapidly increasing using different paradigms 
(e.g., false memory implantation, doctored videos, imagination inflation) and together, their 
findings evidently show the ease with which belief can be undermined. All in all, in our view, 
Fernández (in press) conflates the concepts belief and recollection and describes them in a 
confusing and unhelpful manner that could potentially lead to a conceptual blur in the study of 
memory.  
Fabricated Memories of Abuse 
 Fernández (in press) argues that under certain circumstances, fabricated memories of 
abuse can be beneficial. We must take umbrage at this remark as well as object strenuously to the 
reasoning put forward by Fernández. His line of argumentation conflicts with the extant literature 
on trauma, memory, and false memory. Consider Fernández’(p. 8) key example, which is a 
fictitious scenario: “Let us imagine that, early in my childhood, I once witnessed my uncle giving 
a terrible beating to my mother; his sister. In fact, let us imagine that it was so early in my 
childhood that I am no longer able to recover that memory. Many years later, I invariably feel 
the desire to hate my uncle whenever I need to interact with him. Every time that I am in his 
presence, I realize that, quite simply, I want to hate the guy. This makes me ashamed of myself 
since, not being able to remember anything about the violent incident that I once witnessed, I 
cannot find anything particularly despicable about my uncle.”   
 In this hypothetical scenario, Fernández (in press) implicitly addresses several issues. 
Thus, he discusses failure to remember a traumatic incident that happened early in childhood. 
This refers to childhood amnesia, a phenomenon that has indeed been studied extensively (e.g., 
Howe & Courage, 1993; Gross, Jack, David, & Hayne. 2013). However, Fernández apparently 
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thinks that when no specific recollection of a traumatic event is available, negative feelings (e.g., 
hate against the uncle) are nevertheless retained somewhere and somehow influence behaviour in 
a decisive way. This is a variant of the controversial idea of repression (e.g., Piper, Lillevik, & 
Kritzer, 2008) whereby traumatic memories, although blocked from conscious awareness and 
being inaccessible for retrieval, might still affect someone’s behaviour via implicit associations. 
This conceptualization has, however, been extensively criticized in the memory field and a 
recurrent point is that the empirical evidence for such dynamics are completely lacking (see e.g., 
McNally, 2005; Patihis, Lilienfeld, Ho, & Loftus, 2014).  
Admittedly, some clinicians have proposed that a traumatic memory will be entirely 
organized on an implicit level and that the trauma can affect behaviour in other ways (e.g., 
negative feelings; van der Kolk, 1994). However, research has shown that implicit memories of 
trauma do not affect behaviour in solitude, but are accompanied by conscious, explicit memories 
of trauma. Also, the idea of repression is frequently confused with general (memory) well-known 
mechanisms and principles as ordinary forgetting, incomplete encoding, and non-disclosure of 
traumatic information (McNally, 2005). Most importantly, we contend that there is not even a 
trace of evidence to support the view that a traumatic event that has fallen prey to infantile 
amnesia may still later on guide behaviour due to implicit evaluations. We would argue that the 
burden of proof is on the shoulder of those – like Fernández – who come up with such eccentric 
scenarios. Of course, scenarios may be hypothetical, but they must have some empirical merits, 
otherwise we are left with science fiction. 
Building on his eccentric Uncle-scenario, Fernández (in press) goes on to stipulate why 
fabricated memories might be beneficial. He writes (p. 8): “[c]onsider, now, the fabricated 
memory wherein I represent my uncle as molesting me while I was a child. Fabricating this 
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memory would provide me with a reason which, in my view, entitles me to hate my uncle. And 
this, in turn, would allow me to experience hate towards him without any harm to my own self-
concept. Thus, it seems that, in this scenario, my fabricated memory of abuse is beneficial 
despite being distorted.” We find this reasoning far from compelling, if not straight out naive. 
Although false memories might be beneficial for retaining a positive self (Conway & Loveday, 
in press), a next step in the Uncle-scenario could be that the person takes his false memory so 
seriously that he goes to the police and files an official accusation. It looks like Fernández 
ignored the history of the field he is writing about. That people may act upon false memories, 
even to the point that they are willing to share them with representatives of the law has been 
described in the 19
th
 century hypnosis literature (see, for an example, Rosen, Sageman & Loftus, 
2004). In the 90’s, the legal implications of false memories and how they can devastate innocent 
people served as the major impetus for more recent research on false memories (Loftus, 1995). 
Since that time studies have documented time and again that false traumatic memories can lead 
to similar emotional responses as true memories of trauma, the implication of which is that 
fabricated memories of abuse are not beneficial at all (McNally et al., 2004). The point here is 
that such false memories of abuse, precisely because they are experienced as extremely painful 
and feel like an authentic memory, may be acted upon and may result in criminal proceedings 
against innocent people (e.g., Howe, 2013; Loftus & Davis, 2006).  
What are the Benefits of Memory Distortion?  
 The fictitious scenarios sketched by Fernández (in press) do not convincingly 
demonstrate that memory distortions are beneficial, but we acknowledge that the issue of 
whether there are benefits to having memory distortions is a legitimate one. The older psychiatric 
literature provides case descriptions of patients who were misinformed by their therapists about 
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the details of aversive life events they had experienced in such a way that the patients came to 
remember a less dramatic version of these events. A case in point is the 19
th
 century French 
psychiatrist Pierre Janet, who, according to historian Hacking (1995, p.196) “fooled his patients” 
in a therapeutic fashion by using misinformation tactics. While his patients may have benefitted 
from their false memories, a treatment approach based on positive misinformation would be 
considered ethically unacceptable today.  
Apart from this historical example, there is recent laboratory research highlighting that 
under some conditions, memory distortions might yield positive effects such as increased 
problem solving (e.g., Howe, Garner, Dewhurst, & Ball, 2010; Howe, Garner, & Patel, 2013). 
For example, Howe and colleagues (2010) presented adult participants with lists containing 
associatively-related words (e.g., web, insect, bug, fly) known to effectively evoke false 
memories (i.e., spider). After the list presentation, participants received a memory test and were 
then confronted with compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems. In this problem-solving 
task, participants were shown three words (e.g., widow, bite, house) and they had to come up 
with a single word linking all words with each other. Importantly, the non-presented words of the 
associatively-related lists served as the solution to some of these CRATs. The principal result 
was that when participants produced false memories, CRAT problems were solved more 
frequently and significantly faster relative to when problems were not primed by these 
associatively-related lists. This phenomenon has been replicated using child samples (Howe, 
Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011) and generalized to verbal proportional analogy problems 
(Howe, Threadgold, Norbury, Garner, & Ball, 2013). Also, recent work has shown in the 
laboratory context that false memories of words that were related to survival-related situations 
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(e.g., death) served as better primes for solving CRATs than neutral false memories (Howe et al., 
2013). We were surprised that this work was not cited by Fernández. 
 We have recently extended this line of research and examined whether false memories 
might have beneficial outcomes on a task linked to intelligence (Otgaar, Howe, van Beers, van 
Hoof, Bronzwaer, & Smeets, in press). Participants were presented with negative and neutral 
associatively-related wordlists. After receiving a memory test, participants were involved in a 
perceptual closure task in which they viewed degraded (presented and non-presented) stimuli 
that became clearer over time. This task was similar to subtests of intelligence in which people 
receive degraded stimuli and have to indicate what the stimuli represent (e.g., Luteijn & Barelds, 
2004). Identifications referring to false memories were significantly faster than those based on 
true memories, which suggests that false memories may serve a priming function.  
 Collectively, these studies show that under some conditions, false memories can 
encourage performance on secondary tasks related to problem solving and intelligence. 
Likewise, Dewhurst, Thorley, Hammond, and Ormerod (2011) showed that memory distortions 
were related to creativity. Also, Howe (2011) and Schacter, Guerin, and St. Jacques (2011) 
argued that many false memories are the result of imaginative processes, ones that give us the 
opportunity to simulate future events, ones that might be vital for our survival. This view 
indicates that our memory is flexible at being able to remember the past, interpret the present, 
and simulate future events all of which are indicative of an extremely adaptive memory system. 
This adaptive flexibility comes at a cost: It is susceptible to memory errors that can arise because 
of the potential confusion between what we imagined and what is reconstructed from memory.  
Implications and Conclusions 
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The arguments and hypothetical examples used by Fernández (in press) can have some 
unfortunate practical implications. Fernández states that negative feelings might linger for years 
after someone has forgotten a traumatic event. If one would take this position seriously, then this 
could affect settings in which therapists treat children and adults with alleged horrendous 
experiences. Therapists might come to believe that when children (or adults) have certain 
“strange” feelings without any explanation for them, the origins of these feelings or signals 
might be traced back to sexual abuse that has been forgotten. However, research clearly 
demonstrates the risks of false positives when using such signals to assess whether someone has 
been abused (e.g., Kendall-Tackett, Williams, & Finkelhor, 1993). Placing a confidence in these 
signals might lead therapists to falsely interpret certain “symptoms” as being the result of sexual 
abuse and they then might ask suggestive questions to “uncover” whether a patient has forgotten 
history of abuse. Unfortunately, this approach may give rise to false memories of childhood 
abuse (see Loftus, 1996; Howe, 2013; Patihis, Ho, Tingen, Lilienfeld, & Loftus, 2013).    
The idea that fabricated memories of abuse can sometimes be beneficial is debatable. 
Although we agree that memory distortion may have under some conditions positive carry-over 
effects to performance on other tasks, we strongly argue that fabricated memories of abuse do 
not fall under these conditions. Some clinicians still use certain therapies (e.g., memory recovery, 
hypnosis, dream interpretation) to help patients with their alleged trauma history. However, as 
noted, these techniques might actually fuel the formation of false, but not true memories (Howe, 
2013; Patihis et al., 2013). Ideas put forward by Fernández might cause therapists to carry on 
with their questionable techniques despite the fact that these techniques could catalyze memory 
distortion.  
Benefits of Memory Distortion 
 
 13 
To conclude, in the present commentary, we have illustrated that the paper by Fernández 
(in press) employs concepts such as belief and recollection in an ambiguous manner. We 
disagree with Fernández about the argumentation and examples put forward to support his view 
on memory distortion. Of course, it is vital that “new” ideas about memory, including the 
benefits of memory distortion, be raised but they should be grounded in theory and empirical 
arguments.  If not, speculation about traumatic memories could lead to misunderstandings about 
how memory works. Even worse, such misunderstandings might be embraced in clinical settings 
in which more serious damage could result than that which emerges from mere theoretical 
confusion.  
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Footnote 
1In the present paper, we will mainly use the term “recollection” instead of “memory”. The 
reason is that memory (or autobiographical memory) stands for the entire experience of recalling 
events happening to the self in the past (Scoboria et al., 2014). Fernández (in press) probably 
used the term “memory” to refer to “recollection” or the mental re-experience of an event.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
